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A Exploration of the Research Literature on, and Discussion of the Possible 
Interaction Between, Religiosity, Values, and Adolescent Development. 
by 
Paul F. Russell BTheo!MelbCoi/Div, BEdNDA, BA(J'sych)EdithCowan 
Faculty of Community Studies, Education and Social Sciences, 
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup. 
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Abstract 
The current work examined the areas of religiosity, values and adolescent 
development. The recent literature with regard to the nature of religiosity as a 
measure of an individual'' commitment to a particular religion was explored. The 
issues of measurement and definition were outlined, and a position was taken as to 
the multi-dimensionality of religiosity. The recent work on values by Schwartz 
(1992) was also explored. Values were defined and the theory of a universal set 
of values, as well as the relationship of values to each other was outlined, along 
with the organisation of those individual values into value types. The relationship 
between values and religiosity was explored. The area of adolescent 
development, based on the theory of psychosocial development proposed by 
Erikson (1968, 1977) was also explored. This understanding of the nature of 
adolescent development has suggested that adolescents must explore issues such 
as politics and religion as part of that stage of development. It was suggested that 
adolescent development, therefore, had a significant possibility of impacting on 
the relationship between values and religiosity. This possible impact of 
adolescent development on both values and religiosity was suggested. 
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Whether or not students adopt an appropriate values system is a significant 
concern for any educational institution, but is particularly paramount for a 
religious school (Russell, 1997). The religious school is charged with the task of 
conveying the dominant culture no less than other schools, but in such a way that 
tbe entire curricula is enlivened and permeated with the values of the sponsoring 
Church. The effectiveness of the religious school, then, rests not only with exam 
results, university entrance or hours spent in religion classes, but rather the real 
formation ofthe young people within the school in the model of the sponsoring 
Church. 
While only 16% of Australians profess having no religion, and the vast 
majority of Australians profess memb.,rship of one of the mainstream Christian 
churches, the amount of time spent in religious activity by Australians on average 
is decreasing (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997, 1999). It may be suggested 
that attendance at worship services is seen as of secondary importance to the 
members who will accept the values and moral code of the church, but not the 
discipline of regular attendance at church services. Alternatively, it may be the 
case that the drop in church attendance is reflective of an alienation both from the 
church itself and the moral code and discipline that the church promotes. 
The relationship between religiosity as a measure of how religious an 
individual is and the values that the individual holds is the focus of a number of 
studies. In particular, research by Roccas and Schwartz (1997) and Schwartz and 
Huismans (1995) indicate a strong correlation between religiosity and values, but 
do not address the strength of this relationship in younger people. 
'' .. 
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For those involved in education within a religious context, the correlation 
between values and religiosity is an important one, but the impact of adolescent 
development on this relationship adds another significant dimension. The area of 
adolescent development is one of particular importance in this area of school 
effectiveness. It is of paramount importance that all programmes of study, and 
indeed the mTangement of all school activity, be designed and modified according 
to what is known about the psychology of adolescent development so as to most 
effectively achieve the programme's objectives. In the area ofreEgious 
development, all programmes of religious education, and all activity which seeks 
to inculcate the values of the sponsoring church, must also be designed with 
appropriate attention to adolescent development. In this way, the aim of the 
effective socialisation of the adolescent may be achieved. 
In addition to the research in the three areas of religiosity, values and 
adolescent development, consideration must be made ofthe interaction between 
each of these. The current work seeks to review the significant literature and 
research in the areas of religiosity, values and adolescent development, and further. 
seeks to make some theoretical connections between these three areas based on 
the previous research. Some suggested avenues for future research and study will 
be proposed. 
Religiosity 
Definition and Measurement Concerns 
Any discussion on the impact of religiosity within psychology must first 
resolve the linked problems of definition and measurement. Without a clear and 
accepted definition of religiosity, an effective measure of the levels of religiosity 
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cannot be developed. A cursory glance at the literature on religiosity will 
demonstrate that even with a working definition, measuring religiosity is not a 
simple task. This is despite the fact that systematic research into the area of the 
psychology of religion has been conducted since the later part of the nineteenth 
century (Wulff, 1991). Measures of religiosity vary from crude single-item 
questions (e.g., Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) to more 
complex questionnaires (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Francis & Stubbs, 1987; 
Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, ! 997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). 
These differences in the measurement of religiosity spring from differences in the 
conceptual understanding of the nature of religiosity itself. 
In attempting to find a common definition of religiosity, a distinction must 
be made between a focus on motivation and on practice. It may be the case that a 
simple definition of religiosity is focussed on either church attendance or religious 
affiliation. In this way religiosity may be assessed with questions such as "What 
religion are you?", "How often do you attend religious services?", or even. '"To 
what extent would you describe yourself as religious?". It is only the last of these 
which would come close to an attempt at assessing the extent to which an 
individual has internalised the religious beliefs and values oftheir religion, but 
may also just as easily be interpreted in terms of mere ?ractice. Thus people may 
see themselves as more or less religious because of the number oftimes they 
attend church services, rather than the extent to which they accept the values of 
the Church and pmfess its creed. 
Conversely, religiosity may be seen specifically as an attempt to measure 
the motivation for an individual's attendance at church services. In this way, 
6 
people are more or less religious on the basis that they attend their church for 
'religious' reasons, such as to worship God or to pray, rather than for perceived 
social benefit. This definition forms the basis of the intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiosity proposed by Allport and Ross (1967) in their investigation into religion 
and prejudice, and much replicated in later studies. It is important to note, 
however, that in that study the distinction was made between high extrinsic and 
high intrinsic motivation, rather than high religiosity on the basis of either 
extrinsic or intrinsic responses. 
Finally, it may be possible to see religiosity as the measure of acceptance 
and knowledge of religious doctrine. Hence, the ability to recite biblical texts or 
church doctrine and the level of acceptance of specific doctrine would be seen as a 
reflection ofthe level of religiosity. This is at least part of the measure of 
religiosity examined by instruments such as the Shepherd Scale (Pecnik & 
Epperson, 1985). According to one author, however, while this assessment of 
religiosity through creedal asseot forms part of a number of instruments, the 
method should be seen as a "serious shortcoming of the majority of existing 
scales" (Wulff, 1991, p.215). 
The difficulties in the area of the psychology of religion are therefore two-
fold: the lack of a widely accepted definition of religiosity, and the too common 
practice in the research literature of failing to provide an operational definition of 
religiosity. A brief discussion on the major avenues of research into the 
psychology of religion and religiosity follows. 
'-'· ·-:; -
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Multi- Versus Uni-Dimension«} 
The simplest conception of religiosity is that of a single dimension factor, 
aod is usunlly measured by a single-item on a larger questionnaire. Often it 
focuses on behaviour, with the measure being that of church attendance. While 
there would seem to be some support for this position (Wulff, 1991 ), the greater 
amount of research literature argues for a multi-dimensional understanding of 
religiosity (see e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; DeJong. Faulkner, & Warland, 1976; 
Donahue, 1985; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester, & Brown, 1995; Francis & 
Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch et al., 1997; Joseph & 
Lewis, 1997; Plan« & Boccaccini, 1997; Trimble, 1997). Many studies have 
utilised factor analytic methods in an attempt to detennine the number and kind of 
the dimensions of religiosity (for a review see DeJong et al., 1976), with the 
number of dimensions of religiosity varying from three to ten. Often the 
dimensions suggested are similar, giving further credence to the theoretical 
position that religiosity is multi-dimensional. 
The case for the multi-dimensionality of religiosity begins with the 
assertion that, even at its face value "religion seems far too complex an area of 
human behaviour - as diverse and heterogeneous as human behaviour - not to 
include many different and unrelated types of variables" (Dites, 1969, cited in 
DeJong~~ al., 1976, p.889). Cross-cultural studies (DeJong et al., 1976) have 
suggested support for the multi-dimensional position. Indeed, at the most basic 
level, Allport and Ross (1967) noted that the motivation for attendance at 
religious services suggested significant differences in religiosity. 
I 
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The nature of religiosity, however, is often determined by the research. It 
is possible to conceptualise religiosity as a single dimension when religiosity is 
not the central focus ofth• research. It is clear that it is possible to soparate 
people along a single dimension of religious or not-religious (Benda & Corwyo, 
1997; Gorsuch, 1984) should that be desirable. Similarly thoug.i, it is possible to 
separate religious people into at least two dimensions (Allport & Ross, 1967). 
The current work conceptualises religiosity in a multi-dimensional manner. 
Religiosity is viewed as a measurement of the extent to which an individual has 
internalised the doctrines and practices of the religion. 
Extrinsic versus Intrinsic 
Throughout the literature, there is considerable reference made to the early 
work of Allport and Ross (1967) on religion and prejudice, from which carne the 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity. In many ways this research 
can be seen as the progenitor of those current theories based on the multi-
dimensional nature of religiosity. In that research, the authors reviewed numerous 
earlier studies all of which noted that on average churchgoers were more 
prejudiced than non-churchgoers. This would seem to have been a surprising 
result, as the mainstream Churches in the United States during the time of the civil 
rights movement were taking an open stand against prejudice, and were losing 
both members and financial support because of that stand. On a more theological 
level, Allport and Ross (1967) noted that the message of equality and common 
humanity which was representative of all great world religions, in addition to the 
example of numerous and varied religious leaders, seemed to contradict the 
message of prejudice that was being lived at least by some religious people. 
" ~Wf~{<L~·;,t~'tj.i;;'~\!;.%·:.:c;l· •· '·'' · ···· ·· .,,.-'.-' ... -~·-:· ' 
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In addressing that apparent contradiction, Allport aod Ross (1967) came to 
suggest that a distinction could be made between the type of religiosity that was 
being demonstrated. That study found that the relationship between church 
attendance aod prejudice was cmvilinear. In essence, while seldom attenders 
were seen to be more prejudiced than non-religious people, frequent attenders 
were less prejudiced than infrequent attenders, aod often less than non-attenders 
(Allport & Ross, 1967, p.433). It is beyond the scope of the current study to 
review the literature which is focussed on the levels of prejudice. It is importao~ 
however, to see that a distinction was drawn between formal behaviours, such as 
attendance at church services, and involvement or commitment to religious 
values. That difference was characterised in the following way: 
It seems obvious that the regular attenders who go to church once a week 
or oftener are people who receive something of special ideological and 
experiential meaning. Irregular; casual fringe members, on the other hand, 
regard their religious contacts as less binding, less absorbing, Jess integral 
with their personal lives .... Perhaps the briefest way to characterise the 
two poles of subjective religion is to say that the extrinsically motivated 
person uses his [or her] religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated 
person lives his [or her] religion (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434). 
In this way, the extrinsically motivated person would be seen to use their religious 
contacts for personal gain, such as for social contact, to provide security and 
solace, status or self-justification, where as the intrinsically motivated person 
would find in the religious values of their church a "master motive" for Jiving 
(Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434). 
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While the extrinsic and intrinsic distinction is maintained in more recent 
literature, a further clarification is offered. This later research has developed the 
concept of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, and a number of authors (e.g., 
Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, & Gorsuch, 1997) have 
suggested that extrinsic religiosity can be further defined into two categories: 
personally-, and socially- orientated extrinsic motivation. In this way, the 
extrinsic motivation for church attendance was separated into those extrinsic items 
that were oriented towards personal gain, such as the solace achieved thorough 
worship, and the social benefit gained, such as maintaining friendships. The 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, seen as being personally 
committed in the way conceptualised by Allport and Ross (1967), remains. 
Indeed the later research shows support for the intrinsic conceptualisation, in 
addition to that support offered for the two types of extrinsic motivation. While 
this clarification is seen by some researchers as being significant enough to 
warrant a renewed examination of the extrinsic/intrinsic research (e.g., DeJong et 
al., 1976; Gorsuch et al., 1997), it remains that the distinction is inherent in the 
Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualisation of religiosity, who defined the 
extrinsically religious as those who found religion "useful in a variety of ways" 
(p.434). Both those who found solace and those who found social status and 
contact were seen to be extrinsic, and it was the distinction between extrinsic and 
intrinsic which was seen to be significant. As that study notes, "to know that a 
person is in some sense 'religious' is not as important as to know the role religion 
plays in the economy of his [or her] life" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.442). In the 
same way it can be conceptualised that knowing which extrinsic motivation is 
'•• .... 
" .. ' 
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stronger is not as important as knowing whether a person is extrinsically or 
intrinsically motivated. 
In later research, a further distinction is also made between the current 
understanding of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and the original Allport and 
Ross (1967) conceptualisation of those terms. In that earlier research religiosity 
was seen as something of o single continuum and individuals were located 
somewhere on it at either the extrinsic or the intrinsic end. Further, that research 
tended to conceptualise religiosity in an almost categorical manner, suggesting 
that people were either intrinsic or extrinsic in their religiosity. Allport and Ross 
(1967) found it difficult to see people able to vacillate between the two extremes, 
or indeed to locate people in the middle with traits ofboth extrinsic and intrinsic 
religiosity, and so these indiscriminately proreligious were effectively excluded 
from the category of being religious, or at the very least seen as "obscuring" the 
results (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.441). 
The current rosearch conceptualises a far greater fluidity in the 
motivations. It is both possible for people to have some of each of these three 
motivations, and to change the 'level' of their motivation. At any given time, 
therefore, an individual may be more or less intrinsically or extrinsically 
motivated. This does not necessarily suggest that people change the basic 
motivation randomly; it is still possible to conceptualise individuals who are 
predominantly extrhsically or intrinsically motivated. It does, however, allow for 
the possibility that even the most intrinsically motivated person may also be a 
little extrinsically motivated, and that this level of extrinsic motivation may 
change slightly from time to time. As one study notes (Gorsuch et al., 1997), it is 
', ,:-. 
-'.··- . 
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the nature of accepting a multidimensional understanding of religiosity that it is 
also necessary to accept that one person's motivation may not be identical to 
another's, and that each person may be religious for multiple reasons. While the 
original research did not conceptualise this level of fluidity, it would seem to be 
common in more contemporary studies to accept that a person may participate in a 
religious ritual for any number of reasons, both extrinsic and intrinsic. 
One further clarification about religiosity must also be made. In the early 
work by Allport and Ross {1967) church attendance was assumed and religiosity 
was measured was, in the first instance, by the level of church attendance. The 
research focus then shifted to an examination of the motivation for church 
attendance. In later research the focus moves again, and a significant debate has 
been waged on religiosity as either a multi- or a uni-dimensional concept. The 
multi-dimensional position is argued on the basis of Allport and Ross' (1967) 
original work, and focuses on the motivation for church attendance (e.g., Gorsuch, 
Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, 1997). Clearly in this model, people at a 
worship service might be there for either intrinsic or extrinsic reasons, and the 
primary motivation of one may be of little concern to another. Similarly, an 
individual may attend religious service to worship God (intrinsic), receive grace 
(extrinsic personal) and enjoy community fellowship (extrinsic social). Indeed, 
these three things might well motivate people at the same time, each 'taking turns' 
at being the primary motivation. 
This confusion about the distinctiveness of religiosity and motivation for 
church attendance may have overly complicated the research in this area. 
Following the work of Donohue (1985), a distinction is made between attendance 
J 0-. 
-, ---:' - ' 
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at church services and personal religious con.mitment. In each uf !he major 
studies reviewed, attendance at church services has been assumed, and it is the 
motivation for attendance which is measured and conceptualised as being either 
extrinsic or intrinsic. An effective conceptualisation of religiosity as a 
multidimensional concept, however, must be able to incorporate a religiousness 
which is not tied to church attendance. 
The current work seeks to conceptualise religiosity in a way which moves 
beyond mere church attendance because, for example, it is postulated that church 
attendance may well be coerced in younger people and will thus fail to reflect any 
sense of religious commitment. Conversely, while a strong belief in a deity will 
impact on behavior, the experience of the divine and a sense of being a religious 
person may well not be connected to attendance at church services, especially for 
young people who, it will be argued later, are able to experience being religious 
before they are able to commit to a particular religious tradition. Hence, 
religiosity is neither mere church attendance nor the reasons for church 
attendance. It must be conceptualised as an experience ofbeing a part of a 
universe that is created by a deity, to whom it is possible to relate in some way. 
Values 
The concept of value is central to a number of theories of the nature of the 
human person, and thus has a wide range of meanings both within psychological 
literature, wider academic literature and in common usage. Possibly the first 
significant attempt to explore and define values within a psychological framework 
was that conducted byRokeach (1960, 1968, 1975). Here we find an attempt to 
.·differentiate between related concepts such as be:ief, attitude, value and value-
',·.·'· ' 
·~ . 
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system. For Rokeach, a value is seen to be akin to a disposition a person may 
have. It is similar to an attitude, which in that study is defined as "an organisation 
of beliefs ... [and] a set of interrelated predispositions focussed on an attitude 
object or situation" (Rokeach, 1975, p.l20), however, a value is more basic than 
an attitude, and may underlie the attitude. 
A value is also distinct from but related to a belief In its simplest 
definition a belief is a proposition which can be preceded by the phrase 'I believe 
that ... ' (Rokeach, 1975, p.113). A belief is seen to have three components: a 
cognitive component, reflecting what is known about the focus of the belief; an 
affective component, reflecting the commitment the person has to the belief, and 
the arousal the person will experience if the beliefis challenged; and a 
behavioural component, because the belief a person holds will motivate a 
patticular behaviour. In this conceptualisation, a value is defmed as: 
a type ofbelief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about 
how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of 
existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are thus abstract ideals, 
positive or negative, not tied to any specific object or situation, 
representing a person's beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal 
terminal goals (Rokeach, 1975, p.l24). 
It is in the nature of the object that is seen as important that Ne find the difference 
between a belief and a value: beliefs are specific, while values are a special type 
ofbeliefwhich are abstract and focussed on ideals. In this way a person might be 
seen to have "tens or hundreds ofthousands of beliefs, thousands of attitudes but 
only dozens of values" (Rokeach, 1975, p.l24). 
IS 
In more recent times, a number of studies have advanced the theory of 
values and values research, most notably those of Schwartz and Bilsky (I 987, 
1990) and Schwartz (1992). While Rokeach (1960, 1968, 1975) examined the 
relationship between values, beliefs and the values system, he made little attempt 
to organise values into a coherent structure. This is the focus of the later studies. 
The definition of values offered in ihe later studies is drawn from earlier work. In 
this way values are seen as consisting of five features, and are defined as 
"concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend 
specific situations, guide selection or evaluation ofbehaviour or events, and are 
ordered by relative importance' (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.SSl). 
An immediate similarity may be seen between this definition and the 
earlier one offered by Rok.,.ch (1975), in that this definition also contains specific 
cognitive and behavioural cor .. 1ponents, and infers a level of commitment 
suggested by the affective component. The final part ofthis later definition of 
value focuses on the manner in which the value fits into a wider value structure, 
which is inherent in the earlier Rokeach definition and which finds its expression 
as Rokeach describes the concept of the value system. There is one immediate 
difference, however, between the two definitions: the distinction between belief 
and value made by Rokeach seems to be lost. 
It is not in the subtle definitional changes, however, that these later studies 
differ from the earlier ones. The advancement is made in the way these later 
studies attempt to organise individual values into a typology of value groups, 
which are initially called motivational domains, according to the content of the 
individual value. This arrangement is done initially on the basis of the theoretical 
,·._·;_ 
position that values are cognitive representations of one of three basic and 
universal human requirements: biological needs, social interactional needs, and 
social institutional needs (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). As •'· 'riginal theory is 
developed, the motivational domaius are relabelled as :n. Jnal types, the 
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seven initial domains are extended to eleven, and then reduced to ten, and the 
definitions and names of the domains themselves are sharpened (Schwartz, 1992). 
The ten domains are listed, along with short definitions, in Table I. The specific 
arrangement of values into value types as suggested by Schwartz (1992) is to be 
found in as an Appendix. 
In addition to the suggestion that individual values may be grouped into 
value types, the recent literature (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & 
Huismans, 1995) has also suggested that a relationship between the value types 
may be found. Essentially, the achievement of one value type through a range of 
action is either compatible or incompatible with the attainment of another value 
type. In the example offered by Schwartz ( 1992), actions in support of Obedience 
will be likely to conflict with actions in support oflndependence, but be 
supportive of those aimed at Social Order. In this new theory of values, an overall 
structure is suggested for the various value types, outlining the relationship 
between the value types. This structure is represented by Figure I. Values 
adjacent to each other are suggested by Schwartz (1992) to have actions 
compatible '"ith the attainment of both value types. Greater distance suggests 
decreasing compatibility, and those values opposite each other are seen to be in 
direct conflict. In this way, actions that would lead to the satisfaction of the 
power values are also those that would lead to the satisfaction of achievement or 
security values, but would be contradictory to the satisfaction ofthe values of 
universalism. 
Hence, in the recent work Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) and by 
Schwartz (1992), values are seen to be motivational, related to evaluation about 
the worth or otherwise of various beliefs or events, abstract and universal. 
17 
Further, individual values can be seen to be related to other individual values, and 
may be grouped into similar motivational value types. Finally, these value types 
may be seen to be more or less related to each other, in as much as the actions 
which either support or contradict the attainment of a given value type may be 
seen to be more or less either supportive of, or in conflict with, another value type. 
Values and Religiosity 
Just as a relationship between the different value types can be observed 
and explored, a relationship between specific behaviour and the various value 
types can also be hypothesised. In this way, a relationship between religious 
behaviour and the various value types can also be examined. The strength of the 
value for religion and associated behaviour cannot be underestimated. In 
Schwartz (1992), spirituality is added as a possible eleventh domain, and then 
rejected because of insufficient empirical support. While the data did not suggest 
this to be the case, the theory behind the support of spirituality is sound and 
should be briefly explored. In proposing the eleven motivational value types to be 
explored, Schwartz (1992) suggested that the search for meaning is an inherent 
force in the human life, and this would be reflected by a value type of spirituality. 
In the way that spirituality was defined in that study, its existence as a value type 
was not supported. Two reasons are offered as to why this was not the case. 
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Firstly, as Schwartz ( 1992) notes, it may be that people are finding meaning 
through other types of values. Specifically: 
The pursuit of meaning and coherence as described by theologians and 
philosophers may entail a level of sophisticated, effortful thought that is 
beyond that in which most people typically engage. Instead, most people 
may satisfY their need for coherence through pursuing tradition, security, 
and conformity values (Schwartz, I 992, p.1 0). 
By defining spirituality as a search for meaning, it may be that the value may not 
be robuSt enough to survive on its own. Secondly, it may be that spirituality finds 
its expression though a number of different and specific values, rather than 
through a distinct value type of its own. Interestingly, this is much more in line 
with other work in the area of spirituality, which suggests that this is the case 
(e.g., Chandler, Holden, & Kolander, 1992; Westgate, 1996). Regardless of 
which of these two are accepted, it is obvious that spiritual concerns are likely to 
have a significant impact both on values, and by valuing spirituality, on 
behaviour. In later studies Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Roccas and 
Schwartz (1997) examined the hypothesised relationship between values and 
religious behaviour, suggesting that a clear relationship between religiosity and 
value types may be maintained. This relationship is outlined below. 
The original values theory discussed above (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) suggested a relationship between value 
types, with behaviour advancing one value type being seen as either supportive of, 
or contrary to, the advancement on another votll o type. This same relationship can 
be seen to exist in the behaviour exercised in advancement of the value of 'being 
·,_,·,·, 
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religious', which is suggested forms part of several value types, and is the focus of 
the study conducted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Roccas and Schwartz 
(1997). In exploring the relationship between religiosity, which is defined simply 
in that study as the "degree of commitment to religion" (Schwartz & Huismans, 
1995, p.98), a brief examination ofthe theological, sociological and philosophical 
aspects of religiosity were compared to the contents of the value types. 
This later study suggested that the activity of all religions was the search 
for meaning beyond the immediate through belief and worship, and that this was 
achieved through the function of religion in encouraging its members to "temper 
self-indulgent tendencies and to foster transcendental concerns and beliefs ... 
[through] promulgating religious creeds, mmal proscriptions, and ritual 
requirements" (Schwartz& Huismans, 1995, p.91). Higher religiosity, measured 
in that study by a simple single-item question, was seen to reflect acceptance of 
those requirements and proscription& Therefore, a clear relationship between 
higher religiosity and various value type could be hypothesised. For example, 
high religiosity was seen to be closely related to the value type Traditio!], as it was 
that value type t!1at contained values that emphasised acceptance of traditional 
rituals and customs, and submission to transcendental ar.thority (Roccas & 
Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). The hypothesised relationships 
between religiosity and the different value types are listed in Table 2. 
The findings of the study conducted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995) 
and later replicated (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997) seem to suggest support for the 
general theory that a relationship between religious behaviour and value types 
exists, and for the most part that the relationship was as predicted by the 
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researchers. In all cases where a direction was predicted for the correlation, that 
direction was observed, although not always with the predicted strength. The 
actual correlations between value types and religiosity is displayed as Table 3. 
The researchers also claim that their data suggest that the relationship between 
value religiosity is a two-directional one: specifically, being religious both 
influences value priorities and is influenced by already developed value priorities. 
They summarise their findings in this way: 
The overall pattern of consistent religiosity. value correlations suggests 
that valuing certainty, self-restraint, and submission to superior external 
verities inclines people to become more religious in general; valuing 
openness to change and free self-expression inclines people to become Jess 
religious (Schwartz & Huismans, I 995, p.1 05). 
Adolescent Development 
While Schwartz and Huismans (1995) outlined a theory which explored 
the relationship between values and religiosity, that theory has not been applied to 
the adolescent. The relationship between religiosily and values for adolescents 
may well reflect the rolationship found in adult samples, however, the impact of 
adolescent development may change the shape of that relationship, and so a brief 
examination of adolescent development as suggested by Erikson (1968, 1977) is 
now offered. The basis of Erikson's theory of development is threefold. Firstly, 
it suggests tltat the development of the person and the personality continues 
throug!t the life-span. Secondly, this development proceeds through a series of 
st&ges, the successful navigation of which is both presuppo•ed by previous stages 
ar1d necessary for subsequent ones. Thirdly, each stage is characterised by a 
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'crisis', the successful resolution of which is neceosary for the development of the 
'virtue' associated with that stage, and for successful progress to the next stage. 
The way that each stage builds on the successful resolution of the previous 
stages, and the successful resolution of which is necessary for subsequent stages, 
is a significant part of the theory of development offered by Erikson (1968, 1977), 
and is called the "epigenetic principle" (Erikson, 1968, p92). The theory suggests 
that development is properly achieved only when the stages are reached "in the 
proper rate and the proper sequence" (Erikson, 1968, p.93). The adolescent stage 
is concerned with resolution of concerns about identity. The resolution of identity 
issues is not attempted before adolescence, but must be resolved before 
subsequent stages can be successfully attempted, although there is some 
suggestion that a certain fluidity is possible. I has also been suggested that 
gender differences may have a significant impact on development at this time 
(Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Marcia & Friedman, 1970), however, this has not yet 
received as wide support as the original theory, and it is beyond the scope of the 
current work to include a detailed review of the possible impact of gender. For 
Erikson, however, the epigenetic principle remains centraL He describes it in the 
following manner: 
The principle states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and that 
out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special 
ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a func!ioning whole 
(Erikson, 1968, p.92). 
. ' 
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Hence, each stage has an over-riding focus specific to that stage alone, but which 
is a vital part oft he whole development of the person and is necessary before the 
successful resolution of the subsequent stages may be achieved. 
The notion ofthe 'crisis' of each stage has also had significant attention, 
· with the 'adolescent crisis' and the 'midlife crisis' receiving common acceptance. 
The specific understanding that Erikson (1968, 1977) had aboutthe crisis of each 
stage is worthy of clarification. Firstly, the crisis is not specific to these two 
times, but is a vital part of each stage. Erikson (1968, 1977) argues that as each 
stage has a specific focal point and is part of a predetermined ground plan, this 
focal point is brought sharply into focus at the appropriate time. This crisis is not 
seen by Erikson (1968, 1977) as a negative, but rather as a "radical change in 
perspective" (Erikson, 1968, p. 96). Ochse and Plug (1986) summarize it in this 
way: 
In each stage conflict arises between newly emerging personal needs and 
social demands, and culminates in a crisis. A crisis is a normal event. It 
represents a turning point in development, rather than a catastrophe, and 
leaves both positive and negative residues that influence the course of 
future development (p.l240). 
The crisis is seen, therefore, as a normal and necessary way in which the primary 
focus of each stage is brought to the attention of the developing person, so that it 
might be addressed. It is this understanding of crisis, and attempts to avoid overly 
negative overtones, that have !ed some to rename crisis with less loaded terms 
such as 'issue' (e.g., Miller, 1993) . 
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The successful resolution of the crisis results in the achievement of a 
specific virtue. Just as each crisis is characterised as an opportunity for growth 
and as a change in perspective, the resolution of each results in the development 
of a new function or characteristic. For example, as the adolescent achieves a 
sense of personal identity, the virtue of fidelity is also achieved, by which the 
adolescent is able to express a commitment to the ideals now part oftbeir identity 
and a loyalty to the people now regarded as important. Despite some 
clarifications and the fact that the majority of research has focussed on the 
adolescent stage (Ochse & Plug, 1986), Erikson's theory is widely accepted and 
has been replicated in other cultures and situations (see, e.g., Wang & Viney, 
1996; Ochse & Plug, 1986). 
For Erikson, the period of adolescence is a particularly critical one, for it is 
in this period that the significant crisis of identity is faced. The adolescent 
struggles with attempting to define a sense of identity and to avoid identity-
diffusion. The concerns for the adolescent are focussed on how they appear to 
themselves and to others and their attempts to define who they are and what they 
believe. The central preoccupations of the adolescent are therefore their desire to 
find someone or something in which to freely believe, their need to freely assent 
in areas of duty and service, their development of trusting friendships, and their 
choice of occupation, which "assumes a significance beyond the question of 
remuneration and status" (Erikson, 1977, p. 129). 
As the adolescent struggles with the old accepted beliefs and tries to 
refocus on what is important and worthy of acceptance, an impact on the 
adolescent's religious activity and expressed values is to be expected. It is a 
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necessary part of attempting to achieve resolution of the identity crisis that 
adolescents examine, and later make, a commitment to occupational choices, 
political beliefs and religious attitudes (Marcia, 1966; Craig-Bray, Adams & 
Dobson, 1988; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra & Dougher, 1994). 
It is important to note that the adolescent does not attempt identity 
resolution in all facets at once. Marcia (1966) and others (e.g., Coleman, 1978) 
have noted that the adolescent is able to focus on individual areas, while putting 
others on 'hold'. In particular, Marcia (1966) has suggested that adolescents 
move through four areas, depeodiog on the level of mature thought and 
commitment. According to Marcia (1966) an adolescent may be categorized into 
one of four groups according to the level of commitment and thought: from 
foreclosure, where a high degree of commitment is demonstrated although there 
has been no attempt at mature thought, through diffusion, with low commitment 
and low thought, to moratorium, with a high degree of thought but no 
commitment and finally to achievement, with a high degree of both thought and 
commitment. In this way, an individual may well have achieved a sense of 
identity in the occupational area, be working on the area of politics but not yet 
have even considered the area of religion. Indeed, Kroger and Green (1996) note 
that a range of events are associated with movement towards achieving identity in 
specific areas. In most cases an internal change is closely associated with 
achieving a sense of identity, especially in the religious area (Kroger & Green, 
1996, p.483). 
' .. ·.' 
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Conclusion 
The relationship between this adolescent stage of development and the 
development of religious beliefs and activity can not be understated. Adolescent 
development should be seen as having the potential to impact on the relationship 
between religiosity and values. The period of adolescence is one which is, of its 
nature, focussed on the re~examination of issues of values and must include an 
examination of the individual's previous and possible future participation in 
religious activity. As the individual faces these religious issues, a mature 
commitment is able to be made to the religion which is seen to support that which 
the adolescent values. As Marcia (1966) notes, however, the period of 
adolescence is punctuated by a movement between the various stages of 
moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion en route to identity achievement. In this 
way individuals are able to face the issues within the crisis of identity one at a 
time. Until the crisis ofidentity includes issues of religion, the individual will not 
necessarily display a mature and reasoned decision on religious issues. In this 
way it is possible that the adolescent may not demonstrate the relationships 
between religiosity and value types displayed in previous studies. 
As value types are motivational, it may well be the case that the 
development of values is stable, and the task of the adolescent is to find 
organisations, people, and institutions which are seen as able to fult11 the already 
established values. A certain amount of stability may be observed (Erikson, 1968) 
as the individual resolves the crisis of each stage in a way which shows a certain 
unity with all that has been previously resolved. The task of development is not to 
constantly recreate the individual personality, but to develop, in harmony with all 
.:--.··." 
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that has been previously achieved, the new potential which is evoked by each 
stage's crisis. In this way, the adolescent is seen by Erikson (1977) to be in search 
of"a new sense of continuity and sameness" (Erikson, 1977, p.235). 
This understanding of the adolescent task of re-examining tho issues in a 
sense of sameness is also reflected in Erikson's (1968) claims that the activity of 
the adolescent revolves around the discovery of people and ideas to "have faith 
in) which also means men [and women] and ideas in whose service it would seem 
worth while to prove oneself trustworthy" (Erikson, 1968, p. 128-129). It is not 
argued that the adolescent searches for new values, but rather that the adolescent 
searches for ideals, people, and institutions which align with the values they 
already have. It is only against an already reasonably defined set of values that 
something is able to be judged "worthy of service" and people are judged "worthy 
of trust". The re-examination of people's worth, personal career choices, and 
religious and political beliefs is undertaken in such a way that assent is given to 
these positions only in so much as these are supported by an already reasonably 
well established set of values. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue this when 
they suggest that "value priorities may influence individuals' commitment to the 
religion they profess and (occasionally) their choice of a specific religion, because 
religions provide opportunities or pose barriers to the attainment of valued goals" 
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.88). In this way, the choice to participate in a 
religious activity is determined by the already well-established value priorities 
held by an individual, as well as the impact of the individual's stage of 
development. 
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In this way, an examination of the value priorities of adolescents may well 
provide some clue as to future activity, especially in the religious sphere. This is 
of obvious interest to those involved in the development of young people through 
religious schools. Clearly, while an individual may not be able to demonstrate the 
developmental ability to make a mature commitment to a particular religion by the 
end of his or her school life, the value priorities are somewhat established. These 
values will either be supportive of, or discordant with, current and future 
participation in religious activity. It is clearly of interest to the religious school, 
whose influence in the area of student participation in religion should not be 
underestimated (e.g., Hyde, 1990), to be able to better socialise the students with 
values oupportive of future participation in religious activity . 
... ,,· ' 
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Table I 
Value Domains and Descriptions (cf, Schwartz, 1992, p.S-12) 
Motivational Types ofValues 
Self-Direction 
Stimulation 
Hedonism 
Achievement 
Power 
Security 
Conformity (earlier labelled restrictive 
conformity) 
Tradition 
Benevolence (earlier labelled prosocial) 
Universalism (includes former type of 
maturity) 
Description 
Derived from need for mastery and 
control, and autonomy and 
independence. Includes 
independent. thought and action. 
Derived from perceived need for 
variety and stimulation and has 
goal of excitement, novelty and 
challenge. I 
Derived from organisimic need for 
pleasure. 
Defined by goal of personal success 
through demonstrated competence. 
Similar to achievement in the self 
esteem gained, but focuses on 
attainm~nt of position within social 
system. 
Derived from need for security, 
safety stability or society and of 
relatipnships. 
Deri~ed from the requirement that 
individuals suppress behaviour that 
might upset or harm others, or 
violate social norms. 
Respect for the traditions and 
customs of society. 
Concern for the welfare of those 
close in everyday interaction 
Concern for the welfare of all 
people and nature 
Table 2 
Hypothesised Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity (Schwartz & 
Huismans, 1995, p.92-92) 
Value Type 
Tradition 
Conformity 
Benevolence 
Security 
Stimulation 
Self-direction 
Hedonism 
Universalism 
Power 
Achievement 
Hypothesised Correlation with religiosity 
Strong Position Correlation 
Positive Correlation 
Positive Correlation 
Positive Correlation 
Negative Correlation 
Negative Correlation 
Strong Negative Correlation 
Little or No Correlation: 
direction not specified 
Little or No Correlation: 
direction not specified 
Little or No Correlation: 
direction not specified 
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Table3 
Actual Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity For Mixed-Nationality 
Sample (n=l716} and For German Sample (n-1807) (Schwartz & Huismans, 
1995, p.98, 101) 
Value Type Correlation (n=l716) Correlation (n=l807) 
Tradition .54 .37 
Conformity .30 .24 
Benevolence .15 .13 
Security .15 .14 
Stimulation -.34 -.32 
Self-direction -.33 -.18 
Hedonism -.39 -.25 
Universalism -.24 -.06 
Power -.08 -.06 
Achievement -.13 -.11 
• All correlations statistically significant at alpha =.01 
:· ;.·' 
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Self-transcendence 
Universalism Benevolence 
Self-Direction Tradition 
Stimulation 
Hedonism Security 
Achievement Power 
Self-enhancement 
Openness to change Conservation 
Figure I. Theoretical structure of relations among motivational Value Types, 
where proximity indicates the degree of compatibility of Value Types. (Schwartz, 
1992, p.45) 
-,' - .. _' 
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Appendix 
Individual Values and Associated Value Types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1987, 1990) 
Self-Direction 
Freedom 
Creativity 
Independent 
Choosing own goals 
Curious 
Self-respect 
Stimulation 
An exciting life 
Daring 
Hedonism 
Pleasure 
Enjoying life 
Achievement 
Ambitious 
Influential 
Capable 
Successful 
Intelligent 
Self-respect 
Puwer 
Social power 
Wealth 
Authority 
Preserving my public image 
Social recognition 
Conformity 
Obedient 
Self-discipline 
Politeness 
Honouring of parents and 
elders 
Security 
National security 
Reciprocation of favours 
Family security 
Sense ofbelonging 
Social order 
Healthy 
Clean 
Tradition 
Respect for tradition 
Devout 
Accepting my portion in life 
Humble 
Moderate 
Benevolence 
Helpful 
Responsible 
Forgiving 
Honest 
Loyal 
Mature love 
True friendship 
Universalism 
Equality 
Unity with nature· 
Wisdom 
A world of beauty 
Social justice 
Broad-minded 
Protecting the environment 
A world at peace 
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Abstract 
The current work examined the relationship between religiosity and values in an 
adolescent group. The participants (N=l()3) were students from a co-educational 
Catholic secondary school in Perth, Western Australia (n=87), and from one of 
four church-based youth groups (!!=16). There were fOrty-one males, aged 
between 16 years and 4 months and 17 years and 11 months (M=16 years and 7 
months), and sixty-three females, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 18 
years and 9 months (M=16 years and 6 months). Each participant completed a 
values survey and a measure of religiosity. The correlations between the value 
types, as defined by Schwartz (1992), and religiosity were calculated. The 
correlation between values and religiosity reached significant levels fur three 
values, Hedonism (L = -.31 ), Stimulation (L = -.24) and Tradition (r = .37). 
Comparisons were made between the current study and previous research, 
extending the research on religiosity and values into an adolescent group. The 
sample was then divided according to higher and lower religiosity, and 
comparisons were made. An assessment of the effectiveness of the school in 
conveying a specific values system was made on this basis. L, light of the 
findings, suggestions for further research were made including an extension of the 
current study to include a wider and more diverse sample, and the use of both an 
extrinsic and intrinsic measure of religiosity with both adolescent and adult 
groups. 
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The primary aim ofthe religious school is not success of the sports field, 
university entrance rates or even simple academic achievement. While ear.h of 
these is important, and welcome in all schools, the religious school differs from 
the non-religious school in that its primary aim is the socialisation of its students 
into the value system of th.o sponsoring church. This is not an easy task, and must 
include an understating of the areas of the psychology of religion, values, and 
adolescent development. The religious school attempts to convey the dominant 
culture in the light of the sponsoring church's values. It is with this in mind that 
the current works seeks to briefly review the three areas of the psychology of 
religion, values, and adolescent development, as well as the relationship between 
them. 
Recent work (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) has 
suggested that values are both universal and organised in a particular way. 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) define values as having five features: they are 
"concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend 
specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour or events, and are 
ordered by relative importance" (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.55!). In this there is 
little deviation from previous work on values (e.g., Rokeach, 1960, 1968, 1975), 
however, this recent work has suggested an armngement of values which is 
unique. Accordii<g to recent studies (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), values are both universal, and may be organised into 
ten motivational value types. This organisation of value types t~nd individual 
values is demonstrated in Table I. In this way, a relationship is seen between 
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individual values, which either support or oppose various other individual values, 
and between groups of values, which again either support or oppose other value 
types. Thus, the individual values of An Exciting Life, A Varied Life, and Daring 
are grouped into the value type Stimulation. This value type may be seen as 
opposing the value types of Conformity and Tradition, but is seen as being similar 
in content to, and therefore supporting of, the value types of Hedonism and Self-
Direction. The proposed relationship between value types is demonstrated in 
Figure I. 
Another dimension to the religious school is the level of student 
participation in the religious life of the educational community. Participation in 
the religious rites of the sponsoring church is seen as a reflection of the level of 
assent to the values of that church. As can been seen from an exploration of 
adolescent devolopment, however, it would be unwise to suggest that mere 
participation in the worship rituals of the church would necessarily be reflective of 
the acceptance of the values of that church. It may well be the case that 
participation is discordant with the student's values, and is motivated by quite 
different values. Similarly, non-participation does not necessarily reflect a 
rejection of the church's values. In both cases, the individual may well have not 
yet developed a deep commitment to the religious institution, but may well still be 
in the process of the exploration that is a vital part of this stage of development. 
Any understanding of religiosity must, therefore, be able to incorporate this 
flexibility. 
The simplest conception of religiosity is that of a single dimension factor 
and while there would seem to be some support for this position (Wulff, 1991) the 
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greater amount of research literature argues for a multi-dimensional understanding 
of religiosity (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; DeJong, Faulkner, & Warland, 1976; 
Donahue, 1985; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester, & Brown, 1995; Francis & 
Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & 
Johnson, 1997; Joseph & Lewis, 1997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997; Trimble, 
1997). Arguably the most significant development in the understanding of 
religiosity has been the work by Allport and Ross (1967), which suggested that 
religiosity operates on two levels. Based on research about religiosity and 
prejudice, Allport and Ross {1967) suggested that a fundamental distinction could 
be made in religiosity: that of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. 
For Allport and Ross {1967) the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiosity was based on the motivation for participation in religious activity. 
Those motivated by personal gain were demonstrating extrinsic religiosity, while 
those motivated by more ideological reasons were demonstrating intrinsic 
religiosity. More simply put, the intrinsic 'lived' their religion, while the extrinsic 
'used' their religion (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434). While developments have 
been suggested since the early work of Allport and Ross (1967), the basic 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity remains. 
Thus, while it may be possible to determine if a person is religious or not 
on the basis of a single question, it is far more useful to be able to understand the 
impact that an individual's religion has in the manner in which that individual 
lives out their life. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity is 
seen as useful as it enables a conceptualisation of the level of religious activity as 
well as some understanding of the level of religious commitment. While adults 
... -:' 
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are likely to differ in their motivation for participation in religious activity, 
adolescents are especially likely to participate in religious activity for a wide 
range of extrinsic reasons because oftheir level of maturity in the area of religious 
beliefs and commitment. This understanding of religiosity is, therefore, a useful 
one when addressing adolescent participation in religious activity. 
The established theory of adolescent development stems from the work by 
Erikson (1968, 1977), which, while not specifically a theory of adolescent 
development but rather that of the whole lifespan, has none-the-less initiated a 
great deal of research on the period of adolescence. Erikson's (1968, 1977) theory 
of development is based on the 'epigenetic principle', where by development of 
ego and personality is seen to follow a clear plan. The successful negotiation of 
each stage of development is both dependent on the successful completion on the 
previous stages, and necessary for the successful navigation of all subsequent 
stages. Similarly, the issues raised at each stage are part of a plan, and arc raised 
only when appropriate, and not before. In the same way, the issues central to each 
stage of development are important foundations for subsequent stages. 
Each stage is characterised by one important issue, for example the issue 
of identity for the adolescent. Successful personality and ego development is 
dependent on that issue being raised and appropriately dealt with at the right time. 
This process of sharply bringing the relevant issue into focus is called a crisis by 
Erikson (1968, 1977). This crisis is not seen by Erikson (1968, 1977) as negative, 
but rather as a "radical change in perspective" (Erikson, 1968, p. 96}. The crisis is 
merely the way that the issue central to that stage is brought into the attention of 
the individual so that successful resolution may take place. 
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The successful resolution of each crisis brings with it a virtue closely 
associated with that issue. For example, the adolescent is faced with the crisis of 
identity, where by issues of self-identity are addressed. The adolescent must 
examine how he or she looks to themselves, and to significant others. Issues of 
occupation and of political and religious beliefs must be examined and decide 
upon. The virtue of fidelity is closely associated with this stage. Just as each 
crisis is characterised as an opportunity for growth and as a change in perspective, 
the resolution of each results in the development of a new function or 
characteristic. For example, as the adolescent achieves a sense of personal 
identity, the virtue of fidelity is also achieved. In this way, as the adolescent 
determines what is important, what is worthy of acceptance and what is to be 
taken on as part of the new identity, the adolescent is also able to develop the 
faithfulness to maintain those things which have been determined to be important. 
With this new forming identity comes the virtue of fidelity, by which the 
adolescent is able to express a commitment to the ideals now part of their identity 
and a loyalty to the people now regarded as important. 
Hence, the period of adolescence is one characterised by issues ofidentity. 
Concern with how an individual looks to others is important. This period is a time 
during which the accepted rules and beliefs are re-examined. Occupational 
concerns are of great importance, well beyond the issue of mere remuneration. 
Political and religious beliefs must be challenged. The development of identity is, 
itself, a process with stages (see Marcia, 1966). Different aspects of identity, such 
as occupational and religious beliefs, are addressed at different times, and a 
suspension of thought about beliefs is observed {Erikson, 1959; Erikson, 1968; 
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Erikson, 1982; Marcia, 1966; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra, & Dougher, 1994). 
Towards the end of this period, the individual begins to show a mature 
commitment to those beliefs and people that have shown themselves worthy of 
acceptance and support. The development of fidelity is seen. For the school 
attempting to convey a set of values, the period towards the end of the school life 
is of greatest significance. 
The current work, therefore, sees a direct connection between values, 
religiosity, and development. Clearly, as values are motivational, the level of 
religious involvement will be determined to a great extent by the value priorities 
of the individual. Similarly, as the individual may not have yet been faced with a 
crisis that demands a clarification of religious behefs, or at least will not have yet 
resolved that crisis, it may be usefully assumed that the value priorities expressed 
by an adolescent will precede a mature commitment to religious activity, while 
being supportive of that commitment. While Hyde (1990) has demonstrated the 
significant imp•.ct of the •chool on student religiosity, it must be clear that factors 
other than the school impact on student values and religiosity, and this 
relationship is characterised by Figure 2. In this way, while the influence of 
family, society, development, and personal values can be seen to impact on 
individual religiosity, the complex way in which the school has an impact, both 
directly and indirectly, can also be seen. 
The performance of the school as an institution which is charged both by 
the parents and by the sponsoring church to convey a particular set of values, 
however, cannot be understated. In as much as it can, the school must be able to 
justify its existence by asserting that it does have an impact on student values and 
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student religiosity. The current work, therefore, sets to examine the school's 
ability to achieve its aim of impacting effectively on student values and 
religiosity. 
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In light of the understanding of religiosity outlined previously, it was 
decided in the current work to improve the procedure of the previous studies 
(Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) with regard to the 
measurement of religiosity. Roccas and Schwartz (1997) argue that adopting a 
unidimensional understanding of religiosity is appropriate because that study 
measured a general sense, rather than specific components, of religiousness. The 
majority of research literature reviewed, however, demands an understanding of 
religiosity as a multidimensional concept (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Argyle & 
Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Donahue, 1985; Francis, 1989; Francis et al., 1995; Francis 
& Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch et al., 1997). Further, 
Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that religiosity is the measure of the "degree 
of commitment to religion" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.88). As that study 
sought to examine the relationship between this commitment and values, it can 
safely be assumed that the measure of religiosity used was at least implicitly 
measuring a degree oflived commitment, rather than a mere attachment to the 
religion for social reasons. Clearly, in light of the distinction between extrinsic 
and intrinsic religiosity offered by Allport and Ross ( 1967), at least some attempt 
to differentiate between an intrinsic and an extrinsic commitment to religion is 
necessary. 
The current work utilises a definition based on an assumption about the 
multi-dimensional nature of religiosity, and therefore seeks to measure the 
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religiosity of the participants on the basis of a more detailed questionnaire which 
includes an attempt to examine religiosity on an intrinsic scale. The reasons for 
this were three-fold. Firstly, somewhat in opposition to the previous studies, it 
was felt that it was not appropriate to measure religiosity as a single~item question 
in this case. Single~item measures of religiosity are seen to be useful in cases 
where religion has already been seen to have an effect but when it is not the 
central concern (e.g., Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). Clearly, in 
the current study, religiosity is the central concern and on this basis alone a single-
item questionnaire would seem to be inappropriate. Secondly, the nature of the 
study demands that account be taken of the lived commitment to religion: in 
essence, the nature of the study demands that religiosity be measured in a way that 
includes an intrinsic dimension. The focus of the current study is that ofthe 
impact that a commitment to religion has on values, and vice versa. It is 
presumed that a purely extrinsic commitment to religion will not impact on values 
in the same way that an intrinsic commitment will, and it was therefore seen to be 
necessary to differentiate between a "general religious conviction" and an 
assessment of the "social importance of religion" (Miller & Eells, 1998, p.252). 
Thirdly, the focus of the current work on adolescents adds a new dimension. 
Erikson (1968, 1977) argues that the period of adolescence is one within which it 
is necessary for the adolescent to examine questions of identity. This examination 
of identity must include an examination of issues such as values and religious 
beliefs (Marcia, 1966). In light of this, a measure of religiosity must be sensitive 
enough to differentiate between a level of religious activity motivated by a 
genuine concern and commitment to the values of the religion, and a level of 
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activity motivated by parental or peer pressure. A single-item question about 
church attendance, as was the case in previous studies (e.g., Schwanz & 
Huismans, 1995), cannot capture the essence of a lived religious commitment, and 
this is panicularly the case in the lives of adolescents. 
Based on previous research, it is predicted that a relationship between 
values, as conceptualised and measured by Schwanz ( 1992), and religiosity will 
emerge. This relationship between values and religiosity is demonstrated in Table 
2. On the first level, the current study seeks to el<lend that previous research to 
examine adolescents' values and religiosity. It is therefore hypothesised that, 
allowing for a small amount of variance due to the emotional immaturity of the 
panicipants, the relationship between values and religiosity within the adolescent 
group examined will not differ greatly from the relationship between religiosity 
and values found in the previous research (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwanz & 
Huismans, 1995). 
The motivational nature of values suggests that value priorities will be 
adopted prior to any real commitment to a religious organisation is made, and that 
the value priorities adopted will influence the individual's religious commitment. 
As adolescents develop at different rates, it is assumed that some of the 
panicipants will have made a sincere religious commitment and others will have 
rejected religion, while others will not have come to a mature conclusion. The 
task of the religious school, however, is to socialise all its students into the value 
system of the sponsoring church. While the school may be seen to be successful 
in regards to those students tltat have made a commitment to a panicular religion, 
there is a greater number of students for whom that mature commitment is not 
''· ' 
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possible during their enrollment at the school. As adolescent development theory 
suggests, the crisis of identity associated with religious issues must be faced, but 
may well be faced at a later point in the period of adolescence (Kroger & Green, 
1996; Flum, 1994). Indeed, it may not be possible for many adolescents to make 
the mature commitment demanded of them prior to leaving the school (Fium, 
1994, p. 490). The challenge before the school is therefore to ensure that the 
values of the adolescents who are not able to make this mature commitment to 
religion during their period at school are at least compatible with a commitment to 
religion which may be made later. In this way, the effectiveness of the religious 
school may be assessed by examining the differences between the value priorities 
of the students who have made mature religious commitment, and those who have 
not. If the school has been successful in its task of socialising its students into the 
value system of the sponsoring church, students who are able to make this mature 
commitment to their religion will have similar values to \hose students who are 
not able to make this mature religious committment. Assuming the success ofthe 
school in socialising all of its students into a values system compatible with a 
mature commitment to the sponsoring church, it is hypothesised that no difference 
will be observed in the values of the higher and lower religiosity students. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants (N=I03) were senior school students from a Catholic co-
educational secondary school (!!=87), and from one of four Catholic church-based 
youth groups (n=l6) in Perth, Western Australia. There were forty-one males, 
aged between 16 years and 4 months and 17 years and II months (M=I6 years 
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and 7 months), and sixty-three females, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 
18 years and 9 months (M=J6 years and 6 months). All Senior students at the 
school were invited to participate, and the school was selected both because it was 
of average size and because of its convenience for access by the researcher. All 
youth groups located in the North of Perth were contacted, and all students in their 
final year of school were invited to participate. Youth group members were 
included to ensure that a range of religiosity scores including the higher end of 
possible scores could be obtained. 
Materials 
The participants were administered the Schwartz (1991) Values Survey 
(SVS), within which individuals note the importance of 56 values in their lives on 
a nine point Likert scale, from -1 meaning opposed to the participants' values, 
through to 7 for those values which are of paramount importance. These 
individual values are then organised into motivational value types, according to 
the arrangement of values proposed by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) (see Appendix A). The mean of the 
individual values is obtained to give a score for each of the value types indicating 
its importance. The individual values and their associated value types are listed in 
Appendix B. 
Participants were also administered the Francis Scale of Attitudes to 
•Christianity (Short form) (FSAC) (Francis & Stubbs, 1987). In this participants 
mark, on a five point Likert scale, the level of their agreement with eight 
statements about the Christian faith, such as "I like to learn about God very 
much", and "I know Jesus helps me". Three statements ("I think the bible is out 
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of date", "I find it hard to believe in God", and "I think going to church is a waste 
of time") were negatively coded (see Appendix C). Also on a five point scale, 
participants also indicated their agreement with a single question about their 
perception oftheir own religiousness ("I am a religious person"). Participants 
were also asked the note the level of church attendance on a five point scale 
(weekly, monthly, a couple of times a year, rarely, never), and their frequency of 
personal prayer (daily, weekly, monthly, rarely, never). Participants also 
indicated their religion, age, and gender. 
Procedure 
Following approval of the project from the University School of 
Psychology Ethics Committee, the Principal, and all senior teachers involved, the 
participants in the school group were given the information sheet in the week prior 
to 1- ,ing asked to complete the questionnaire. A notice was placed in the school 
newsletter, which goes to every home, ir.dicating that a questionnaire would be 
completed, and requesting parents 'with objections or questions to contact the 
researcher or supervisor. There were no objections. 
In the school, all questionnaires were administered in groups by the 
researcher in class time over two days. For the youth group participants the 
questionnaires were administered during their youth group meeting. All 
participants were given an information sheet prior to the questionnaire being 
administered (see Appendix D), and were asked to complete a consent form (see 
Appendix E). All participants were given !he opportunity to ask questions before 
and after the administration ofthe surveys. The order of the SVS and the FSAC 
was varied with half the questionnaires having the SVS first and half having the 
' 
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FSAC first. The front page, giving general instructions and with biographical 
questions about age aod gender, remained the same. 
In the case of the youth groups, the adult leaders of the youth groups were 
contacted, sent information sheets, and arrangements were made for the researcher 
to attend the youth groups over a six week period. The participants in the youth 
groups were given the information sheet and consent form, and completed the 
questionnaire immediately. All were given the opportunity to ask questions 
before aod after the administration of the surveys. 
Results 
All data from the completed questionnaires were entered into SPSS for 
Windows. Individual values were summed to give value type scores following the 
procedure outlined by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). For example, the mean of the scores for the specific 
values An Exciting Life, A Varied Life, and Daring is obtained to give a score for 
the value type Stimulation. 
The mean of the individual FSAC items was obtained to give a religiosity 
score for each participant. The descriptive statistics for the FSAC scores, the 
responses to the questions about church attendance, prayer frequency, and 
agreement with the statement, "I am a religious person", are indicated in Table 3. 
The correlations between the value types and the religiosity scores, as well 
as between the value types and the three single-item religiosity questions, were 
obtained. With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, four correlations 
reached statistically significant levels: Hedonism, and Stimulation were 
correlated with the FSAC, Tradition was correlated with the FSAC, the Stated 
. -'. :: '. 
54 
level of Religious Feeling, and with Prayer Frequency, and Conformity was 
correlated only with Prayer Frequency. The range of correlations, indicating those 
that have reached a level of statistical significance, are displayed in Table 4. 
Previous research (e.g., Francis, & Stubbs, 1987; Francis, 1989; Francis, 
Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester & Brown, 1995) has not provided any normative level 
to indicate a point at which high intrinsic religiosity is assumed. Similarly, data 
collected from an adult sample could not easily be compared as the measure used 
differed slightly from the version commonly used with adolescents. In order to be 
able to examine any differences between the value priorities of those who 
demonstrate a level of mature and lived commitment to their religion, and those 
who do not, the group was divided into two according to FSAC scores, with 
scores of3. 75 of higher constituting higher religiosity, and other scores 
constituting lower religiosity. 
The cutoff point used to distinguish between high intrinsic religious 
commitment and low was based on reference to the scale labels. A mean score of 
four would be obtained if an individual indicated agreement with all statements of 
the FSAC. It was felt, however, that a certain degree of uncertainty could be 
expected and tolerated in an adolescent sample, without any real decrease in lived 
religious commitment. The score chosen could be obtained, therefore, if an 
individual indicated uncertain for two statements and agreement for all others. A 
series of independent !-tests were conducted (alpha= .01) and indicated that the 
groups differed significantly on the FSAC scores,! (87.30) = -13.57, ll < .001, and 
the stated level of religious commitment,! (98.85) = -7.63, ll < .001. The groups 
did not differ at a statistically significant level on the measure of ch~rch 
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attendance, 1 (101) = -1.64, R =.II, or level of personal prayer,! (71.96) = -2.15, ll 
= .03. 
Having divided the group into those with higher religiosity (n = 42, M = 
4.21, SD = .33), and those without (n = 62, M = 2.68, SD = .79), a series of! tests 
were conducted to determine the difference between value types for the two 
groups, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005. All statistical 
assumptions were met. As shown in Table 5, only two value types were 
statistically significantly different, Hedonism,! (101) = 3.48, and Stimulatio!l,! 
(101) = 2.99. 
The correlations between FSAC scores and value types for the two groups 
were obtained separately. The results of the ! tests and the correlations between 
religiosity scores and value types are also displayed in Table 5. The value type 
Hedonism, (lower religiosity group M = 5.52, higher religiosity group M = 4.71) 
was negatively and non-significantly correlated for both groups, but a stronger 
negative correlation was observed for the higher group, while the value type 
Stimulation (lower group M= 5.11, higher group M = 4.32) was negativity 
correlated with religiosity for the lower group, but positively correlated for the 
higher group, although again these results were not statistically significant. 
Discussion 
An examination of the correlations between religiosity and value types for 
the whole group suggests some support for the first hypothesis, although in many 
cases the results fail to reach statistically significant levels. While individual 
differences may be observed, tbe similarities between this sample and previous 
studies does suggest some support for the theory proposed about the relationship 
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between religiosity and values (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 
1995), although in only three cases were the correlations between religiosity and 
value type consistent with that predicted by the previous studies: Hedonism, 
Stimulation, and Tradition .. 
With respect to the differences observed between the current sample and 
previous research, some may be explained by reference to adolescent development 
theory. Others may be explained by reference to this specific sample, and may 
well not occur in other samples of adolescents. For example, in the previous 
study (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), the correlation between religiosity and the 
motivational value type of Self-Direction was found to be a negative one. 
Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that Self-Direction is something of a threat 
to religiosity, because it "emphasises openness to change ... [and] may threaten 
social order and increase individual uncertainty" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, 
p.92-93). In an adolescent group, however, openness to change, challenge of 
societal order and a sense of individual uncertainty is a vital part of the 
exploration necessary for the resolution of the identity crisis that Erikson (1967, 
1977) suggests is indicative of that developmental stage. Indeed, a sense of 
individual self-direction is promoted in schools as the students struggle to select 
subjects and prepare for work and study at a post-secondary level. This 
independent thought and activity is a stated part ofthe curriculum. (Curriculum 
Council, 1998). Hence, rather than Self-Direction being seen in the adolescent as 
negatively correlated with an acceptance of religion, valuing Self-Direction 
should been seen as characteristic of all adolescents, regardless of their level of 
religiosity. 
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Differences are also observed in the relationship between Religiosity and 
Universalism (moderately negative in previous studies and positive in the current 
study), Conformity (moderately positive in previous studies and marginal in the 
current study), and Security (positive in previous studies and marginally negative 
in the current study). These can be explained by an examination of the issues of 
religiosity in subsequent paragraphs. 
Following the partitioning of the sample into higher and lower intrinsic 
religiosity groups, a number of differences can be seen in the correlations between 
religiosity and different value types for the two groups. What is somewhat 
surprising, however, is the direction of a number of the correlations which are 
different to those predicted by Schwartz and Huismans (I 995). For example, it is 
predicted that the relationship between religiosity and both the value types 
Tradition and Conformity will be strongly positive, and that the relationship 
between religiosity and the value type Stimulation will be strongly negative 
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). It could be suggested, then, that the group with 
higher religiosity would show a strong reflection of these relationships. In fact, 
however, the reverse is the case. While the lower religiosity group conforms to 
the predictions made, the higher group does not. In this way Tradition has a 
strong positive correlation with religiosity for the lower group, but no correlation 
for the higher religiosity group. Similarly, Conformity has a strong positive 
correlation with religiosity for the lower religiosity group, but no correlation with 
religiosity for the more religious group. Finally, Stimulation has a negative 
correlation with religiosity for the lower religiosity group and an equally strong 
positive relationship with religiosity for the higher religiosity group, the 
58 
difference between the means but not the correlations for this value type reaching 
statistically significant levels. 
In attempting to understand the differences between these two groups it is 
necessary to briefly examine the theological framework upon which Schwartz and 
Huismans (1995) have made their predictions about the relationship between 
value types and religiosity. It is well beyond the scope of the current work to do 
anything more than briefly glance at these issues, and the discussion will be 
somewhat specific to the sample. It is not possible, for example, to make 
assumptions about all religions, and therefore the discussion will focus only on 
Christian and specifically Catholic theology, as this is the background of both the 
school, and the vast majority of the students who form the sample. 
Contemporary Catholic theology stresses the importance of personal 
conversion and a committed acceptance ofthe life-changing aspects of the Gospel 
message, although the theories of the stages of faith development would argue that 
individuals will not always be able to demonstrate this level of mature 
commitment to religion (e.g., Kohlberg, 1968; Fowler, 1981 ). Theologically, 
however, it is not enough that the Christian attends services or makes an assent to 
the major doctrines of the Church. A real commitment to Jesus and the Church 
demands an intemalisation of the Gospel message of justice and liberation (e.g., 
Hogan, 1993; JohoPaul, 1989, 1993; Haring, 1978; Rahner, 1978). This is 
central to Hogan's (1993) work on morals and ethics. In it he writes: 
[The Church I strives to help people grow beyond the level of role-
conformity of a morality from outside, to the level of a truly loving 
response from a morality from inside .... [Christianity 1 is not limited to the 
'-·· 
- ,: 
59 
transmission of a set of fixed moral truths, but is rather a process of 
stimulating an internal appreciation of the value that is to be realised, of 
perceiving it as a challenge or invitation to authenticity, so that one can 
realise it as part of one's true response to the neighbour and a genuine 
development of oneself (Hogan, 1993, p.43) 
This is also clearly reflected in Haring's (1978) treatise on morals and ethics. In it 
he writes that freedom, rather than a restrictive conformity to norms, is the key 
concept for understanding ethics and Christianity. His understanding of tradition, 
and its place in the religious sphere, is somewhat divergent to that of Schwartz 
and Huismans (1995). Rather than the respectfu~ moderate and accepting vision 
of tradition offered by Schwartz and Huismans (1995), Hiiring argues that "mature 
Christians are not only critical towards past traditions and mores but are extremely 
critical towards the present modes and fads. They also do their best to embody 
their informed and critical response to the signs of the times in new mores, new 
customs and new ways ofthinking" (Hiiring, 1978, p.310). 
There is nothing that theology can fault in Schwartz and Huismans' (1995) 
assertion that religions foster transcendental concerns, however, their 
conceptualisation of the manner in which this is expressed is problematic. While 
religions seek to orient people towards the divine and the transcendent, it is not by 
"promulgating religious creeds, moral proscriptions and ritual requirements, 
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91) per se, but by encouraging a lived 
commitment to God, which may be expressed by behavior which is guided by 
these mores and proscriptions. In contemporary Christian theology the emphasis 
is on freedom, not slavish and unthinking submission, in opposition to the view 
- " 
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offered by Schwartz and Huismans (1995). lfreligiosity is a measure of a real, 
lived commitment to the religion and that for which it stands in the manner 
envisioned by Haring (1978), Hogan (1993) and others, it would be impossible to 
accept that religiosity will be positively correlated with "values that emphasise the 
statu.s quo [such as] Tradition, Conformit~ and Securit~ ... [and negatively to] 
values that emphasise change and following oue's independent judgements ... 
[such as] Stimulation and Self-Direction" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91-92) 
In this way the differences between the groups may be explained. Value 
types which reflect submission and limit freedom, such as Tradition, Conformity 
and to a lesser extent Security, will not be correlated positively with a religiosity 
which is lived and committed, only with a religiosity which is extrinsic, simplistic 
and legalistic, and 'fundamentalist' (Haring, 1978). Only those for whom religion 
is a set of rules to be followed, rather than a lived commitment, will demonstrate 
the correlations with value types which reflect submission. Religiosity, as 
conceptualised by Haring (1978), and which is based on freedom and not slavish 
subntission, will correlate with value types which encourage independence, such 
as Self-Direction and Stimulation. In each ofthese cases, the higher religiosity 
group has demonstrated stronger positive correlations than the lower group. 
With regard to the two value types concerned with care for others, 
Benevolence and Universalism, Schwartz and Huismans (1995) have suggested 
that the former will correlate only weakly, although positively, with religiosity, 
while the later will have a near zero correlation. In the current study, 
Benevolence is significantly correlasted fer the higher religiosity group, but not 
. '• 
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for the lower religiosity group, whiule Universalism has a positive correlation for 
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the higher group. The value type Universalism is of particular importance in 
illustrating the differences both between the two groups, and between different 
conceptualisations of religiosity. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that 
Universalism will have a poor correlation with religiosity because "bringing the 
members into exclusivist, solidary groups, reduces the importance attributed to 
concern for all others" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p. 102). This distinction 
between a care for those within the religion and a care for those outside of it was 
the basis fur the original studies conducted by Allport and Ross (1967) on 
prejudice and religiosity which lead to the distinction between an extrinsic and an 
intrinsic religiosity. This distinction remains, and explains well the differences 
observed both between the two groups in the current study and between this study 
group and the previous studies. 
The differences in the correlations between the two groups may be 
explained, therefore, by reference to the philosophical framework upon which the 
direction of the correlations are predicted, by reference to the intrinsic/extrinsic 
religiosity distinction, or even by merely suggesting that the relationship between 
these values and religiosity is not a liner one, although reference to the 
Scatterplots of the correlations between the FSAC scores and the value types do 
not suggest a non-liner relationship (see Appendix F). Regardless of the 
explanation, it remains that the relationship between values and religiosity would 
be clarified by taking these factors into account in further studies. 
As to the second hypothesis about the success of the religious school: on 
the basis of the assumption offered about values, the data suggest support for the 
work of this religious school in its attempt to convey the values of the sponsoring 
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church. Only two of the value types were significantly different, indicating that, 
for the most part, the students did not differ significantly in their value priorities. 
The differences that were observed may be explained in the differences that would 
be expected to be observed between those with an intrinsic and lived commitment 
to their religion and those who commitment is more extrinsic. The work of the 
Catholic school would best be focussed on the provision of various opportunities 
for the adolescents to be challenged to think deeply about identity issues of 
religion, and in this way to encourage a movement from extrinsic to an intrinsic 
commitment in their students. As to values, however, it would seem that a 
general support for the values of the church are being conveyed, although a level 
of self-control would temper the high value for Hedonism in both groups. 
Clearly the current study cannot be generalised widely. It is limited by the 
size of the sample, the possible geographic confounds, the culture of the single 
school used, and by the fact that only one religion was examined. The current 
study does, however, suggest avenues for further research. Certainly, the impact 
of adolescent development on values and religiosity is an area worthy of future 
investigation. While a theoretical basis may be argued for the links between 
development and values and religiosity, further study would develop the strength 
of this theoretical relationship. 
Further study in the area of the definition of religiosity is also warra.<ted. 
Clearly, the way in which religiosity is conceptualised and measured has the 
potential to have a significant impact in studies examining the relationship 
between religiosity and values. The current study would seem to indicate that a 
lived commitment to religion, as measured by an intrinsic measure, is a stronger 
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indicator of the values motivating an individual's behaviour than an extrinsic 
measure. In further studies on the relationship between religiosity and values it 
would seem that stronger effects would be observed using a measure of intrinsic 
religiosity rather than an extrinsic one. Similarly, it would seem appropriate to 
ensure that the level of religiosity measured is one motivated by a real 
involvement in, and support of, the values system of the church rather than a level 
of religiosity which may well have little to do with supporting the church and its 
doctrine, and more to do with social advantage. It would seem to be useful if an 
examination of the theoretical base upon which predictions about the strength and 
direction of the correlations between religiosity and values are made, in light of 
the differences observed in the current study. 
. . . 
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Table I 
Value Domains and Descriptions (cf, Schwartz, 1992, p.S-12) 
Motivational Types ofValues 
Self-Direction 
Stimulation 
Hedonism 
Achievement 
Power 
Security 
Conformity (earlier labelled restrictive 
confonnity) 
Tradition 
Benevolence (earlier labelled prosocial) 
Universalism (includes fanner type of 
maturity) 
Description 
Derived from need for mastery and 
control, and autonomy and 
independence. Includes 
independent thought and action. 
Derived from perceived need for 
variety and stimulation and has 
goal of excitement, novelty and 
challenge. 
Derived from organisimic need for 
pleasure. 
Defined by goal of personal success 
through demonstrated competence. 
Similar to achievement in the self 
esteem gained, but focuses on 
attainment of position within social 
system. 
Derived from need for security, 
safety stability or society and of 
relationships. 
Derived from the requirement that 
individuals suppress behaviour that 
might upset or harm others, or 
violate social norms. 
Respect for the traditions and 
customs of society. 
Concern for the welfare ofthose 
close in everyday interaction 
Concern for the welfare of all 
people and nature 
Table 2 
H)ljlothesised Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity (Schwartz & 
Huisrnans, 1995, p.92) 
-;-;-::-:;:-----;;---::--:-:-,----;-::---:-:;--;:-·- -Value Type Hypothesised Correlation with religiosity 
Tradition Strong Position Correlation 
Conformity Positive Correlation 
Benevolence Positive Correlation 
Security 
Stimulation 
Self-direction 
Hedonism 
Universalism 
Power 
Achievement 
Positive Correlation 
Negative Correlation 
Negative Correlation 
Strong Negative Correlation 
Little or No Correlation: 
direction not specified 
Little or No Correlation: 
direction not specified 
Little or No Correlation: 
direction not specified 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity Measures 
Measure Mean Std. Deviation Possible Observed 
Range Range 
FSAC Scores 3.29 .99 1-5 1-5 
Stated level of religious 
feeling 3.03 1.38 1-5 1-5 
Church Attendance 2.50 1.39 1-5 I -5 
Prayer Frequency 3.13 1.42 1-5 1-5 
Achievement 5.06 .79 -1 -7 3.00-6.67 
Benevolence 5.22 .82 -1 -7 2.86-7.00 
Conformity 4.57 1.15 -1 -7 1.50-7.00 
Hedonism 5.19 1.22 -1 -7 2.00-7.00 
Power 3.28 1.12 -1 -7 .40-5.60 
Security 4.72 .87 -1 -7 2.71 -6.43 
SelfDirection 5.19 .83 -1 -7 3.50 -7.00 
Stimulation 4.79 1.37 -1 -7 .50-7.00 
Tradition 3.62 1.23 -1-7 .60-5.60 
Universalism 4.69 .96 -1-7 2.00-7.00 
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Table 4 
Correlations Between Religiosity Measures and Value T)'lles 
Value Type FSAC Stated level of Church Prayer 
Score religious feeling attendance frequency 
Achievement -.OS -.10 -.04 .18 
Benevolence .09 .07 -.02 .12 
Conformity .07 -.02 .OS .28. 
Hedonism -.31 • -.18 .02 .02 
Power .OS .02 .03 .17 
Security -.04 -.OS -.08 .13 
SelfDirection .02 .02 -.II -.09 
Stimulation -.24. -.21 -.13 -.03 
Tradition .37. .31* .22 .32. 
Universalism .09 .16 -.20 -.10 
• Indicates statistical significance. Bonferroni adjusted alpha= .005. 
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Table 5 
T-Test Scores of Differences Between Yalue Types. and Correlations Between 
FSAC Scores and Value Types. for Higher and Lower Religiosity Groups. 
FSACNalue Type Correlation-
Value Type I Score (df=!Ol) Higher Group Lower Group 
---~--··--····- ---·---·--.. ·-··-··-·--·---------·-.. ···-Achievement 1.25 .09 .05 
Benevolence .09 .39* .09 
Conformity .67 .02 .24 
Hedonism 3.48** -.16 -.09 
Power .18 -.23 .20 
Security l.l7 .IS .07 
SelfDirection .85 .19 .10 
Stimulation 2.99** .13 -.10 
Tradition -2.30 -.03 .43* 
Universalism -.58 .18 .05 
Statistically significant results are indicated • (alpba- .05) and •• (Bonferroni adjusted alpba 
.005). 
· ... " ·. 
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Self-transcendence 
Universalism Benevolence 
Self-Direction Tradition 
Stimulation 
Hedonism Security 
Achievement Power 
Self-enhancement 
Openness to change Conservation 
Figure I. Theoretical structure of relations among motivational value types, where 
proximity indicates the degree of compatibility of value types. (Schwartz, 1992, 
p.45) 
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Figure 2: Relationship of variables impacting on student religiosity, showing the 
impact of the student's values, society, ego development, the impact of the family 
both directly and through both the choice of school and through the influence on 
values, and the influence of the school itself. 
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Appendix A: 
PERSONAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this section you are to ask yourself: ''What values are important to ME as guiding 
principles in MY life, and what values arc less important to me?" There arc two lists of 
values on the following pages. These values come from different cultures. In the 
parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its 
mearung. 
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you ~! guiding principle in 
YOUR life. Use the rating scale below: 
0-means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you. 
3-means the value is important. 
6-means the value is very important. 
The higher the number (0, 1,2,3,4,5,6), the more important the value is as a guiding 
principle in YOUR life. 
·1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you. 
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life; 
ordinarily there are no more than two such values. 
In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the 
importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible 
between the values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers 
more than once. 
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
opposed 
tomy not 
values important 
-I 0 I 2 3 
of 
very supreme 
important importance 
4 5 6 7 
Before you begin, read values 1 to 30, choose the one that is most important to you and 
rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and rate it 
-1. If there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 to 1, 
according to its importance. Then rate the I~st of the values (to 30). 
VALUES LIST I 
I _EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all) 
2 _INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself) 
3 __ SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance) 
4 __ PLEASURE (gratification of desires) 
5 __ FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought) 
6 __ A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters) 
7 __ SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me) 
8 __ SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society) 
9 __ AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences) 
IO_MEANING OF LIFE(a purpose of life) 
ll __ POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners) 
I2 __ WEAL 1H (material possessions, money) 
13 __ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies) 
I4 __ SELF-RESPECT (be1iefin one's own worth) 
15 __ RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance of indebtedness) 
16 __ CREA TMTY (uniqueness, imagination) 
17 __ A WORLD AT PEACE (freeofwarandconflict) 
18 __ RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs) 
19 __ MATURE LOVE (deep emotional & spiritual intimacy) 
20 __ SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation) 
2l __ DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns) 
22 __ FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones) 
23 __ SOCIAL RECOGNmON (respect, approval by others) 
24 __ UNITY WITII NATURE (fitting into nature) 
25 __ A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change) 
26 __ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) 
27_ AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command) 
28 __ TRUE FRIENDS!HP (close, supportive friends) 
29 __ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts) 
30 __ SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak) 
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VALVES LIST II 
Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as~ guiding 
principle in YOUR life. These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be 
more or less important for you. Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible 
between the values by using all the numbers. 
Before you begin, read values 31 to 56, choose the one that is most important to 
you and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your 
values, or--ifthere is no such value--choose the value least important to you, and 
rate it -1, 0, or I, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values. 
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
opposed of 
to my not 
values important 
very supreme 
important importance 
-I 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 
31 __ 1NDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 
32 __ MODERATE (avoiding extremes offeeling & action) 
33_ LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group) 
34 __ AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring) 
35 __ BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs) 
36 __ HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing) 
37 _DARING (seeking adventure, risk) 
7 
38 __ PROTECTING TIIE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature) 
39 __ 1NFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events) 
40_HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect) 
41 __ CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes) 
42 __ HEAL TilY (not being sick physically or mentally) 
43 __ CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient) 
·, 
44 __ ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances) 
45 __ HONEST (genuine, sincere) 
'··' '_.· '·--
46_ PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "fuce") 
47 __ OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations) 
48_ INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking) 
49 __ HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) 
50 __ ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.) 
51 __ DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief) 
52 __ RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) 
53 CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring) 
54 FORGIVING (willing to pardon others) 
55 __ SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals) 
56 __ CLEAN (neat, tidy) 
1~2~1~;:;··,~ .. : •• , ........ · 
_,, --
79 
AppendixB 
Individual Values and Associated Value Types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1987, 1990) 
Self-Direction 
Freedom 
Creativity 
Independent 
Choosing own goals 
Curious 
Self-respect 
Stimulation 
An exciting life 
Daring 
Hedonism 
Pleasure 
Enjoying life 
Achievement 
Ambitious 
Influential 
Capable 
Successful 
Intelligent 
Self-respect 
Power 
Social power 
Wealth 
Authority 
Preserving my public image 
Social recognition 
Conformity 
Obedient 
Self-discipline 
Politeness 
Honouring of parents and 
elders 
Security 
National security 
Reciprocation of favours 
Family security 
Sense of belonging 
Social order 
Healthy 
Clean 
Tradition 
Respect for tradition 
Devout 
Accepting my portion in life 
Humble 
Moderate 
Benevolence 
Helpful 
Responsible 
Forgiving 
Honest 
Loyal 
Mature love 
True friendship 
Universalism 
Equality 
Unity with nature 
Wisdom 
A world ofbeauty 
Social justice 
Broad-minded 
Proteoting the environment 
A world at peace 
· .. 
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Appendix C 
Measures ofReligiosity. 
How often do you pray? How often do you go to Church? 
0 daily 0 weekly 
0 at least once a week 0 at least once a month 
0 sometimes 0 sometimes 
0 once or twice a year 0 once or twice a year 
0 never 0 never 
What religion are you? (Please tick one) 
0 Catholic 0 Other Christian 
0 Anglican 0 Non-Christian 
0 Orthodox 0 I have no religion 
Do you belong to a church youth group (eg, Antioch) 
0 NO 
0 YES ~ please specify 
·.-, .· ... 
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Below are a list of statements about religion and religious beliefs. On a scale of I 
to 5 where 1 is 'disagree strongly', 5 is 'agree strongly' and 3 is 'uncertain ', 
indicate whether you agree or not with each statement. 
Be honest. Indicate how troe each statement is for .J!JlJl.. 
I 2 3 4 5 
disagree strongly uncertain agree strongly 
I know Jesus helps me 
I think going to church is a waste of time 
God helps me to lead a better life 
I like to learn about God very much 
Prayer helps me a lot 
I know that Jesus is very close to me 
I think the bible is out of date 
I find it hard to believe in God 
I am a religious person 
(see, Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Francis, 1989; Francis, et al, 1995) 
:,·,:;-. 
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AppendixD 
Participant Information Sheet 
INVITATION TO BE INVOLVED IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY 
Dear Year 12 Students: 
As part of my honours year studies iti psychology at Edith Cowan University, I 
am looking at what Year 12 students value in their lives. 
I'd like some help! 
What I'm after is a whole lot of Year 12 students who will agree to complete a 
questionnaire on values. The results will be completely anonymous, so no-one 
will see what you put. I'm !!!!! interested in the results of individual's - only in the 
results from different groups. 
The questionnaire should take no longer than about 30 minutes, and probably 
even less. Afterwards I will be available to discuss the questionnaire with you if 
you want. Please remember, I only want to compare groups! Your individual 
names and results wont be seen by anyone except me. In the final report your 
names will not be included. 
Naturally, you don't have to participate, and if you do, you can change your mind 
at any time (even halfway through). You may find it interesting- especially if 
you plan to go on to study next year in a research based course ( eg social sciences, 
psychology, education), or if you are interested in psychological testing in general 
(like they do for the Police and Defence forces). Hopefully, the data I collect will 
go a long way to help make studying values (and religion) in school more relevant 
and interesting. 
If you have any questions, please ask me. Or, you can call the University and 
speak to my supervisor, [Name] from the Psychology Department, on [Telephone 
Number]. 
I can't do this without your help. 
Many Thanks, 
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Appendix E 
Sample Consent form 
CONSENT FORM 
• 
I, ______________ (STUDENT NAME) 
-1' have read the information provided describing the study, 
-1' have had any questions answered to my satisfaction, and 
agree to participate in this study. 
-1' I understand that I am under no obligation to participate, 
-1' may omit individual questions, or withdraw altogether at any 
time, 
<~' and realise that non-participation will not disadvantage me at 
school. 
I also understand that the data is collected for research only and 
that, while the results may be published, neither my name nor the 
school's name will be used. 
Signature Date 
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Appendix F 
Scatterplots of correlations between religiosity and value types 
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Figure Fl. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Achievement. 
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Figure F2. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Benevolence . 
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Figure F3. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Conformity . 
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Figure F4. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Hedonism. 
--,:-
,._ ' 
- ,, . 
' .. ·.-·:: .-_: :~. - \ i '-. ' ,_. '' ' 
. ': 
87 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• ••• • 
• • • • .. • • ..
• • ... • 
• • .. • .. .. • ... 
• • • .. . ..
• • ...... .. . 
' • • • 
• .. .. • • • .. • 
' 
.. • 
• . .. .. 
• •• 
• • 
' 
.. • ~ 
~ • 2. 
• ' 
; 
' 
4 • • 
""" 
Figure FS. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Power. 
, 
• 
.. • 
• • • •••••••• 
• '•• . .. . • 
... • • • 
• .. . 
• • 
• I • I .. 
•• • •• • 
• • e, t,• •: • I 
• ... .. .. •• ... 
• • 
-• • • .. • • 
• • • • 
r I •. • • 
~ 
~. 
• ' ' • • • • 
.... 
Figure F6. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Security. 
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Figure F7. Scatterplot ofthe relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and tbe value type Self Direction . 
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Figure F8. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
./·-' 
'.· FSAC and the value type Stimulation. 
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Figure F9. Scatterplot ofthe relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Tradition . 
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Figure FlO. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the 
FSAC and the value type Universalism. 
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